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ABSTRACT
Many states have adopted policies aimed at promoting the growth of renewable electricity
within their state. The most salient of these policies is a renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
which mandates that retail electricity providers purchase a predetermined fraction of their
electricity from renewable sources. Renewable portfolio standards are a policy tool likely
to persist for many decades due to the long term goals of many state RPSs and the likely
creation of a federal RPS alongside any comprehensive climate change bill. However, there
is little empirical evidence about the costs of these RPS policies. I take an instrumental vari-
ables approach to estimate the long-run price elasticity of supply of renewable generation.
To instrument for the price paid to renewable generators I use the phased-in implementation
of RPSs over time. Using this IV strategy, my preferred estimate of the supply elasticity is
2.7. This parameter allows me to measure the costs of carbon abatement in the electricity
sector and to compare those costs with the costs of a broader based policy. Using my pa-
rameter estimates, I find that a policy to reduce the CO2 emissions in the northeastern US
electricity sector by 2.5% using only an RPS would cost at least six times more than the
regional cap-and-trade system (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative). The marginal cost of
CO2 abatement is $12 using the most optimistic assumptions for an RPS compared to a
marginal cost of abatement of $2 in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
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Renewable energy has become a prominent policy issue at both the state and federal levels. Many
states have adopted policies aimed at promoting the growth of renewable electricity within their
state to decrease carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, most prominently through a renewable portfolio
standard (RPS). An RPS is a mandate that retail electricity providers purchase a specified fraction
of their electricity sales from renewable sources. A typical RPS is passed by a state legislature
a few years before the first year retail providers are required to meet the standard to allow new
renewable capacity to be built. RPSs usually begin with a requirement that approximately one
percent of electricity be produced by renewable sources and incrementally increases over a 15-25
year period. For example, Massachusetts’s RPS requires retail providers to demonstrate initially
that one percent of their electricity sales come from renewable generation with the amount of
required renewable electricity increasing by between one-half and one percentage points in every
subsequent year. The end goal for Massachusetts’s RPS occurs in 2020, when 15% of electricity
sales must come from renewable sources. (See Figure 1 for example timelines.) If a retail provider
fails to meet its requirement in a given year, it must pay a penalty proportional to the the difference
between the target and the amount of renewable electricity it purchased.
In 1997, three states had renewable portfolio standards (Iowa, Massachusetts, and Nevada)
whereas by the end of 2009, 35 states had passed an RPS into law. (Figure 2 displays the number
of states adopting RPSs in a given year and Figure 3 displays which states have passed RPSs.)
Since the electricity sector accounts for 42% of CO2 emissions nationally, RPSs may have the
ability to substantially decrease CO2 emissions. However, there has been little quantitative exam-
ination of the effectiveness or the cost of CO2 abatement from RPSs, particularly accounting for
heterogeneity in state policies.
This paper estimates the long-run price elasticity of supply of renewable generation capacity
by using state RPS implementation schedules as an instrument for changes in the price received by
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renewable electricity generators. The price elasticity is an important parameter for policy makers
since many states have introduced aggressive RPSs to increase the share of renewable electricity
sold in their state, but policy makers are unlikely to have empirically based estimates of the cost
of these policies.1 I find that the price elasticity of renewable electricity capacity is approximately
2.7. Using my estimates of the long-run supply price elasticity, I calculate the cost of exclusively
using an RPS to decrease the carbon dioxide emissions in the northeastern US. This elasticity
suggests that the cost of abating an equivalent amount of CO2 from an RPS in the northeastern
US is between five and fourteen times larger than the costs of CO2 abatement under a regional
cap-and-trade program (the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative). I estimate the marginal cost of
abatement for a 10% reduction in CO2 emissions to be between $50 and $140 per ton of CO2
compared with an expected price under $10 for the cap-and-trade program.
To identify the long-run supply price elasticity of renewable generating capacity, I use variation
from the prespecified RPS implementation schedules. The incremental changes in demand for re-
newable generation from the implementation schedules create an exogenous change in the demand
for renewable electricity. These changes provide me with an instrument for the price renewable
generators receive for electricity, allowing me to consistently estimate the elasticity of supply.
In order to correctly measure the changes in demand for renewable capacity due to RPSs,
I develop a measure of the strength of the incentives created by a particular state’s RPS. This
measure is different than what has been used in most previous work on RPSs. Menz and Vachon
[11] and Adelaja and Hailu [3] use cross-sectional data to examine the effectiveness of RPSs in
promoting the development of wind generators.2 However, both of these papers treat all RPSs the
same by estimating the effect of RPSs on new capacity using a simple indicator for a state having
1There are some cost estimates of a federal RPS in the literature, for instance see Palmer and Burtraw [15], but
these estimates come from simulation models of the electricity sector rather than empirically estimating the response
to policies.
2There are also a few qualitative assessments of RPS policies. Wiser, Porter and Grace [21] examine many of
the policy design issues associated with RPSs and identify broad principles that could be considered best practices.
Langniss and Wiser [9] also do a qualitative assessment of the Texas RPS and suggest that it has likely been an effective
driver of renewable generation development in Texas.
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an RPS. Both papers find that RPSs are correlated with a greater presence of wind generators in
that state, but they cannot establish any causal link due to their cross-sectional approaches. In
fact, Lyon and Yin [10] suggest that a large wind potential in a state increases the probability of
that state passing an RPS, which suggests the causality may go the other direction. Powers and
Yin [16] do account for much of the heterogeneity in policies and adopt a measure of the RPS
requirement similar to this paper’s measure. By using their preferred method of incorporating
this heterogeneity, they find a significant impact of RPSs on the share of renewable generation.
In another related paper, Kneifel [8] uses panel data on state renewable capacity and attempts
to discern which of the variety of renewable electricity policies are most effective at increasing
in-state renewable electricity capacity.
The papers mentioned above, with the exception of Powers and Yin, assume that all RPSs cre-
ate identical incentives for wind generators regardless of how difficult the policies are to meet.
This is clearly not a valid assumption, given the heterogeneity in the difference between the state
RPS statutory requirements and the amount of new renewable capacity needed to met the RPS. For
instance, the first year that Pennsylvania’s RPS was implemented, the state had more than enough
renewable capacity to meet the requirement; whereas the first year that Delaware’s RPS was imple-
mented enough new renewable generation had to be built to power approximately 2% of the state’s
electricity demand. The difference between the statutory RPS requirement and incentives for new
renewable generating capacity can be seen in Figure 1. The light blue bars display the statutory
requirement, and the dark red bars show the percent of electricity that must be generated by new
sources due to the the RPS.
Importantly, and in contrast to previous work, I aggregate each state RPS to the regional level
weighted by the state’s consumption, since this is the level at which most RPSs create incentives for
wholesale generators. RPSs create incentives for all renewable generators in the region since RPSs
can be met with renewable capacity anywhere in the wholesale market. The requirement effectively
makes each state’s RPS policy an incremental increase in the region’s RPS requirements. Without
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acknowledging that state RPSs are actually regional policies, the previous estimates of the impact
of RPSs on renewable generation are biased toward zero since the effective control group in the
differences-in-differences estimation is contaminated by neighboring states’ policies.
My price elasticity estimates help to inform estimates of the excess burden of CO2 reductions
from RPSs since they are not a first-best policy. In a recent paper, Holland, Hughes, and Knittel
[7] show under general conditions that policies that govern the rate of pollution, rather than the
level (CO2 emissions per megawatt hour rather than total CO2 emissions) cannot be efficient. An
efficient (first-best) policy can be described where the price is equal to the marginal cost plus
the marginal damages from the externality, as in the case of a Pigouvian tax or a cap-and-trade
program.
However, one reason state politicians may prefer an RPS to a cap-and-trade program, even
though it is not a first-best policy, is that it is harder for firms to avoid the requirements of an
RPS than a cap-and-trade program. RPSs are a regulation that is hard for firms to avoid since
they apply to the electricity sold, not produced, in a particular location.3 There is a large literature
examining the extent to which firms avoid environmental regulation by moving production to other
jurisdictions, typically called leakage. (See Fowlie [6] for a discussion of these issues.) Since
leakage is unlikely to be a problem for an RPS but may be under a cap-and-trade program, my
estimates of the excess burden from an RPS can be interpreted as the excess cost to avoid leakage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the details of
RPSs, electricity markets, and the dimensions on which there is heterogeneity in RPS policies. In
Section 3 I develop a model to ground our thinking about renewable generating capacity invest-
ment. In Section 4, I discuss the empirical methodology I use and the key variables. Section 5
describes the data I use to to examine RPSs. Section 6 discusses my results which is followed by
a discussion of the policy implications of my estimates in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
3To the extent that renewable electricity increase electricity prices and residents and business locate in a state based
on electricity prices, there will be some leakage in these policies. However, for all but the most electricity intensive
industries this is likely not to be a problem.
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2 RPS Policy Background
Renewable portfolio standards have become increasingly common over the past twenty years. The
first law resembling an RPS was passed in Iowa in 1983. The Iowa law required the state’s two
investor-owned utilities to install a combined 105 MW of new renewable generating capacity. After
this law, very little legislation was passed at the state level relating to the fuel mix of electricity gen-
erators until 1997 when Massachusetts passed its RPS. This was done as part of the electric utility
restructuring legislation whereby electric generating capacity was separated from retail operations
of electric utilities.4
The RPS requires retail providers to purchase an increasing fraction of their electricity from
renewable generators beginning in 2003. After Massachusetts, many other New England and Mid-
Atlantic states followed suit.5 By December 2009, 35 states had passed an RPS. Figures 3 and 2
show the number of states that passed and RPS in a given year and the spatial distribution of when
RPSs were passed.
Among the 35 states that have passed RPSs in 2009 some of those states do not have a restruc-
tured electricity market. In states that do not have a restructured electricity market, the state public
utility commission tends to have substantial influence over the fuel mix of the vertically integrated
utilities it regulates since new capacity projects must be approved by the public utility commission
and utilities are guaranteed rate of return on their new capacity. This may make a state’s RPS
superfluous if the state has vertically integrated utilities. This is one reason I will focus only on
states that have restructured electricity markets in this paper.
Though all RPSs are passed by state legislatures, nearly every RPS is actually a regional policy
since most states simply require that the renewable electricity used to meet the requirement be
generated within the wholesale market and wholesale electricity markets contain multiple states.
4In a restructured electricity market electricity generators are owned by separate firms from retail providers that
sell electricity to end users. This model is in contrast to a vertically integrated utilities that both sell to consumers and
produce electricity from generators they own. Section 2.1 will discuss this in more detail.
5This was usually done as part of restructuring legislation or shortly afterwards.
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Figure 4 shows the New England, PJM and New York wholesale markets.6,7 Therefore I will
aggregate all of the state RPSs in a region into a single regional requirement. I restrict my attention
in this paper to states with a restructured electricity market and a transparent RPS compliance
mechanism. This restriction allows me to observe the price renewable generators receive for their
electricity. The rest of this section will discuss restructured electricity markets and important
dimensions of variation and then how RPSs work in practice.
2.1 Restructured Electricity Markets and Renewable Energy Credits
States with restructured electricity markets have three main types of market actors: wholesale
electricity generators, retail electricity providers, and end consumers. In restructured electricity
markets, firms typically can only be a wholesale generator (and therefore own generating capacity)
or a retail provider. This is in contrast to the market structure that was common prior to the 1990’s
where retail electricity providers were vertically integrated with wholesale generators, thus owning
generating capacity and selling electricity to consumers.
The restructuring process broke up these vertically integrated firms into retail providers and
wholesale generators and created a wholesale electricity market where generators and retail providers
submit bids to sell and buy electricity. These markets are operated by a regional independent sys-
tem operator that makes sure supply and demand in the electricity market balance in real time.
In addition to selling electricity into the wholesale market, generators that use renewable
sources also create a renewable energy credit with every megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity pro-
duced. Renewable energy credits (RECs) are a pure financial product (in most markets) that retail
6The only states that require the renewable generation be located in the state are states that are a wholesale elec-
tricity market unto themselves, including Texas, California, New York, and Hawaii. Texas and Hawaii have their own
electricity grids, while New York and California have their own Independent System Operators, thus making the state
the natural unit of observation.
7The regions I will examine in this paper are the New England ISO, comprised of Connecticut, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont; the PJM control region, which includes Delaware, Maryland,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and parts of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio; and the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).
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electricity providers are required to purchase to show compliance with a state’s renewable portfolio
standard.8 Typically a REC describes the attributes of the electricity that was produced such as the
location of the generator, the fuel that was used, and the date that the electricity was produced.
Using this information, retail providers can purchase RECs that qualify to meet a particular state’s
RPS. At the end of the year, retail providers retire the RECs that they have purchased to meet the
RPS to the state regulator.
In order to ensure that retail providers comply with RPS requirements, nearly all states have
set up a system of fines for retail providers that are short of their required number of RECs. These
fines, generally called alternative compliance payments, effectively set a price ceiling in the market
for RECs. If a retail provider has not purchased their required number of RECs, the alternative
compliance payment specifies a dollar amount per megawatt hour that the retail provider must pay
to the state. The level of the alternative compliance payment is usually determined by the state’s
public utility commission and is generally above the market price for RECs, giving retail providers
an incentive to purchase RECs instead. Some states explicitly link the alternative compliance
payment to a multiple of the market REC price, while others such as Massachusetts re-evaluate the
penalty every few years to make sure the price is still above the market price for RECs. In many
states, retail providers end up paying relatively few fines. For instance, in 2003, Massachusetts
collected less than 1% of the RPS requirements through alternative compliance payments.
These RECs provide a second stream of revenue for renewable generators. Since the average
cost of renewable generation tends to be higher than that of fossil generation, the revenue from
selling RECs encourages new renewable generating capacity to be built. The total price renewable
generators receive for each MWh of electricity is the price of the electricity plus the price of the
REC.
8California requires retail providers to enter into long term contracts with renewable electricity producers to pur-
chase both the electricity and RECs to fulfill the state’s RPS obligation. This requirement was lifted by the California
Public Utility Commission in March 2010. California retail providers may purchase unbundled RECs to fulfill the
RPS requirement in a limited amount in 2010 and 2011, with the market becoming completely unrestricted in 2012.
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2.2 Variation in State RPSs
Most states’ RPSs have a final goal for their RPS by 2020 or 2025, usually between 10 and 30
percent of electricity sales, but the RPS is phased in over time. For instance, Massachusetts’
end goal is for 15% of electricity sales to come from renewable sources by 2020, but interim
requirements begin in 2003 at 1% of sales and increase by 0.5% or 1% every year until 2020.
Other states have more aggressive schedules by increasing their renewable requirement by a larger
amount every year while other states have large jumps in their requirements, such as California
which has a requirement of 20 percent in 2019, and 33 percent in 2020. The light bars in Figure 1
shows a representative sample of RPS implementation schedules. These implementation schedules
provide the variation across time that will allow estimation of the supply elasticity.
Another important dimension along which state polices differ is the treatment of how retail
providers are required to comply with the policy mandate. In nearly all states, all retail electricity
providers comply with an RPS policy by retiring renewable energy certificates (RECs). Some
states require that the renewable electricity used to meet the RPS be produced within the state,9
while most other states just require that the generator that produced the electricity be part of the
regional transmission organization so that, in theory, the electrons from the renewable electricity
were in the same system. These geographic requirements attempt to get around the problem of
creating a simple reshuffling of electricity purchases. 10
9The states that require RPS generation to be within their borders are Hawaii, Iowa, North Carolina, New York,
and Texas.
10Bushnell, Peterman, and Wolfram [5] show that local, consumer-based policies can be circumvented by a simple
reshuffling of buying/selling pairs. For instance, consider an example where there are just two states with a common
wholesale electricity market: state A has passed a 10% RPS and state B does not have an RPS. Moreover, assume that
state B has enough renewable capacity to meet state A’s RPS requirement, while state A does not have any renewable
generating capacity. Before the RPS was enacted in state A, both states’ retail electricity providers purchased all
of their electricity from within their respective states. (Since there is a common wholesale electricity market, the
electricity prices are equalized across states.) However, after the RPS is enacted, the retail electricity providers in state
A switch to purchasing electricity from the renewable generators in state B and retail providers in state B switch to
purchasing electricity from non-renewable generators in state A. Thus, state A’s RPS has only resulted in reshuffling
the buying/selling pairs and failed to increase the fraction of renewable generating capacity as a whole. As this example
illustrates, this may be a major drawback of state level policies such as RPSs that interact with a interstate market.
However, geographic requirements restrict the amount of reshuffling that is possible under an RPS.
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State RPSs also vary as to which fuels that each state considers eligible to meet the RPS. While
they generally include generation from sources such as wind turbines, solar (both photovoltaic
cells and solar thermal sources), biomass (such as wood or wood waste), landfill gas, and small
hydroelectric generation, some states also consider fuels such as municipal solid waste as renew-
able. In order to encourage specific types of fuels or to encourage a larger set of fuels, some states
have created multi-tiered RPSs. Table 1 shows the fraction of states with an RPS that include each
fuel type in the first tier of its RPS, the average carbon emissions per unit of heat input from using
that fuel, and the average size of generators for each fuel. I will focus only on the first tier of each
state’s RPS since they provide stronger incentives to renewable generators (through higher prices
for the RECs).
Each state must decide how to treat the renewable electricity generating capacity that exists
when the RPS law is passed. Many states allow all existing renewable capacity for wind and solar
generators to produce RECs that qualify to meet the state’s RPS, but treat generators that use other
fuels such as landfill gas, municipal solid waste, and especially hydroelectric facilities differently
depending on when they were built and/or last modified in a substantive way. Most states consider
hydropower installations that are smaller than 30 MW to qualify for the RPS. However, sometimes
incremental additions to larger installations will not qualify for the RPS. Also, some states allow
existing generators to meet only a fraction of the RPS requirement while new generators must meet
the rest.
I have incorporated all of these important dimensions of heterogeneity into my empirical work
and ensured that all of the facilities in my data that are eligible to meet an RPS requirement are
actually eligible under the RPS rules of at least one state in the region. The next section will in-




In this section I develop a model of investment in electricity generating capacity to illustrate the
effect an RPS has on the incentives of electricity producers. The model provides the basic intuition
of how policy can affect generating capacity decisions and motivates my empirical specifications.
Consider a representative firm deciding whether to invest in new generating capacity. For the
power plant to be profitable, the revenue the generator produces over its lifetime must exceed its

























is the price of electricity at time t, q
t
is the quantity of electricity the generator provides at
time t, K0 is the initial capital cost of the generator, mt is the variable operating and maintenance
costs associated with the generator at time t, f
t
, is the fuel cost at time t, T is the number of years
of the useful life of the new capacity, and   is a discount factor.11 In equilibrium this condition
holds with equality. This equilibrium is graphically depicted in Figure 6, with the long-run supply
curve for renewable generation (right axis) separated from the long-run supply curve for fossil
generation (left axis). When demand is perfectly inelastic I can show these supply curves on the
same figure with the length of the horizontal axis showing the total quantity of electricity demanded
(inelastically).12 The vertical line shows the fraction of demand that is met with fossil generating
capacity versus renewable generating capacity. Since retail providers have no preference over the
fuel used for electricity, the equilibrium fraction must be at a point where the price is equalized
across types of generators.
11This profitability condition abstracts away from any payments that generators receive for participating in ancillary
service markets where generators may be paid to be on standby, ready to produce electricity if called upon by the mar-
ket operator. Typically renewable generators are not eligible to participate in these markets due to the unpredictability
of wind and solar generation. However, an increase in the amount of wind and solar generators participating in the
electricity market will cause an increase in demand for standby capacity services from fossil generators.
12This assumption is for convenience in the depiction of the wholesale market. The model does not need this
assumption and is relaxed in the empirical work in the rest of the paper.
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A new generator will enter the market when there is sufficient excess quantity demanded over
the life of the generator such that inequality 3 holds. (This is depicted graphically by lengthening
the horizontal axis, necessarily increasing the market clearing price.) Two ways to induce genera-
tors to enter the market are to decrease the cost of the capital investment or to increase the price the
generator will receive for its electricity over the new capacity’s life span. These two levers have
been used by the federal government to induce more renewable generators to enter the market in
the form of the Investment Tax Credit and the Production Tax Credit, respectively.
Renewable portfolio standards also induce renewable generators to enter the market by shifting
the fraction of demand that is met with renewable sources to the left within the figure. This is not a
change in the total electricity demand but a change in the composition of production. This change
causes a wedge in the price for electricity since renewable generators must receive a higher price
for their electricity to build capacity. The price wedge resulting from the RPS is shown in Figure
7. The price renewable generators need to receive for their electricity to enter the market is pr, but
the equilibrium price given the number of generators in the market is pe, so the difference is made
up by the price of the REC:
p
REC = pr   pe (2)


























for renewable generators. Renewable generators consider the price path of both the price of elec-
tricity and the price of RECs when considering entry decisions. So long as the price of RECs is
expected to be greater than zero, renewable generators have an additional incentive to enter the
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market. Notice also that entry decisions depend on the flow of revenue to the generator over the
life of the generator, not just the contemporaneous revenue.
The profitability condition implies that each generator has a critical (total) price at which it
will enter the market. Therefore, as contemporaneous prices and expectations about future prices
change we see generators entering the market consistent with the profitability condition.
We can derive a supply curve for renewable generators by aggregating each firm’s decision
about whether to enter the market. Each generator enters the market if their profitability condition

































where i indexes generators.13 Notice that there is a generator-specific capital cost, and each gen-
erator can expect a different amount of output. These two terms rationalize why we observe some
renewable generators in existence in areas without a binding RPS. Consider a wind developer
looking at potential locations to install a wind turbine. Not all locations are of equal value to
the developer due to the fact that the wind blows at different speeds and different times at each
location. Sites where the wind blows more frequently, all else equal, will be worth more to the de-
veloper since the turbine will create more electricity and has a marginal cost near zero. Thus, the
best locations will be developed first with each subsequent wind turbine being placed in marginally
inferior location, necessitating a marginally higher price for the electricity generated by that tur-
bine to make it profitable. This suggests that existing renewable capacity satisfies the profitability
condition in equation 3, but that as demand for renewable capacity increases, renewable generators
will need to receive a higher price for their electricity. Thus, the upward slope of the supply curve
is driven by heterogeneity in the value of locations and capital costs.
In order to aggregate across generators, I need to make several assumptions. The main as-
13Note that the same condition holds for fossil generators, except their expectations over the price of RECs do not
enter their profitability condition.
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sumption in the aggregation is that all generators have the same expectations over the trajectory of
prices (electricity and RECs) over the life of each generator. With this assumption, I can rewrite














t+1 , ..., p
REC
t+T ) +  Xt (5)
where X
t
is a set of variables capturing the other factors that effect a generator’s entry decisions
such as fuel costs.
This equation suggests that I can estimate the price elasticity of supply of renewable gener-
ation using the familiar log-log specification by regressing the log of quantity of new renewable
capacity on the log of price and other factors that affect entry decisions. However, this presents the
traditional problem of simultaneous equations bias since price and quantity are determined by the
intersection of supply and demand. Since, price is an endogenous regressor, I need an instrument
for the price that renewable generators receive to consistently estimate this equation.
4 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the long-run price elasticity of supply of renewable capacity, I use the imple-
mentation schedules of state RPSs as an instrument for the price that renewable generators receive
for their electricity and then use the predicted change in price in a second-stage regression to esti-
mate the price elasticity of renewable generation. RPS implementation schedules provide me with
an exogenous change in the demand for renewable generating capacity that can instrument for the
changes in price that renewable generators receive. RPS implementation schedules are typically
written into the original RPS legislation and increase the RPS requirement each year that the RPS
is in effect until the end goal is met. Because these schedules are incremental changes in demand
that are not determined at the same time as the price, and therefore are not correlated with un-
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observed supply shocks, they are a good instrument for the total price that renewable electricity
generators receive for their electricity.
This leads to a way to estimate the the long-run price elasticity of supply for the renewable
generators. Each new RPS requirement increases the demand for RECs, increasing the wedge
between the price that renewable and fossil generators receive for electricity. Importantly, the
change in demand that I observe in the REC market comes from the RPS legislation, making
the variation more plausibly exogenous. Thus, I can separate the change in total electricity price
renewable electricity generators receive due to the RPS from other market forces to trace out the
supply curve of renewable generating capacity and estimate the price elasticity of supply.
4.1 Estimating Equations
My model suggests two natural estimating equations to estimate the long-run price elasticity of
supply. The first-stage equation estimates the price response to an exogenous change in the demand
for RECs. The demand for RECs change in a predictable way due to the implementation schedule
of each state’s RPS. As derived in section 3, new renewable generating capacity should respond to
the entire flow of payments over the life of the generator. To capture this variation I use a measure
of changes in RPSs’ stringency averaged over the next five years.14 This leads to a first stage
equation of the following form:
log(ptotal
it
) =  log(RPS Requirement
it,t+5 years) +  Xit + ↵i +  t + ✏it (6)
where the ↵
i
’s are region fixed effects, the  
t
’s are year and month fixed effects, and X
it
’s are a
set of controls for other policy variables that may effect the incentives of renewable generators.
The region level fixed effects absorb time invariant differences across regions such as differential
14I wil discuss how this variable is constructued in Section 4.3. The results are not sensitive to the choice of a five
year average. The results are similar for averages up to 10 years of the RPS requirement, though are noisier the longer
the time period that is averaged.
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renewable generating potential, as Lyon and Yin [10] suggest may be important in the decision to
adopt an RPS. The year and month fixed effects absorb differences across time that are constant
across region. These are important since over our period of examination various federal tax incen-
tives have taken effect (and occasionally not been renewed immediately) such as the Investment
Tax Credit and the Production Tax credit that affect the financial desirability of building renewable
generation. For a discussion of the history of these policies and their consequences see Metcalf
[12], Wiser et al. [19], and the Joint Committee on Taxation [2]. I also include a group of other
policy variables in both estimating equations, X
it
, to control for other policies that affect the in-
centives for renewable electricity providers unrelated to RPSs. These variables allow for a more
isolated estimate of the effect of only the RPS.15
As discussed in Section 3, generators should be making entry decisions based on the time path
of prices, not just contemporaneous prices. However, most RPSs allow a RECs that were created
and/or purchased in one year to be turned in for compliance in the following two years. Therefore
the contemporaneous REC price contains information about the price of RECs in the future we
should observe generators responding to the contemporaneous price since it is also a signal about
future prices.

















’s are region fixed effects, the  
t
’s are year and month fixed effects, and X
it
’s are a set
of controls for other policy variables as in the first stage.
15These other policy variables are discussed in detail in Section 5.4.
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4.2 Which States get RPSs?
In order for the instrument of RPS stringency to be valid, it must not enter the supply equation
except by entering through the demand equation. The implementation schedule may indeed enter
the supply equation if, for instance, states that have more renewable generating potential choose to
adopt RPSs. This would cause me to overestimate the effects of RPSs since those states are also
likely to develop more renewable generation capacity than other states even in the absence of an
RPS.
Upon casual observation of the dates at which various states adopted their RPS policies, this
doesn’t seem to be a particularly large problem. (See Figure 3 for a description of when each state
passed their RPS.) Some of the states with the largest renewable potential from both wind and solar
are in the Plains states and the Southwest. While many of the states in the Southwest do indeed
have RPSs they are not uniformly early policy adopters. Conversely, most of New England and the
North Atlantic states have adopted RPS policies, some being among the first adopters but do not
have a large renewable generating potential.
Moreover, many of the first adopters of RPS policies adopted their RPS as part of the elec-
tricity restructuring legislation. The electricity restructuring legislation in many of these states
was a major piece of legislation that separated the retail and wholesale electricity markets, making
the latter market a “deregulated” market, usually with plans to make the retail electricity market
a competitive, unregulated market in the future. Most of the deregulation of the electricity mar-
kets were motivated by high retail electricity prices in the state and generally a group of states
in a region deregulated the wholesale electricity market at similar times. There is very little rea-
son to believe that the deregulation legislation is correlated with unobserved covariates that affect
renewable electricity capacity.
Lyon and Yin [10] empirically examine which states get RPSs. Their findings suggest that
wind potential in the state increases the probability of RPS adoption (though not potential in other
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fuels that are typically included in RPSs such as solar or biomass). This will not be a problem for
me since I will be controlling for this variation through my region level fixed effects.
Lyon and Yin also find that high local pollution levels, as measured by the fraction of the pop-
ulation living in counties that are designated as “nonattainment” under the Clean Air Act, increase
the probability of adoption of an RPS as well as some evidence that organized renewable energy
lobbying groups increase the probability of adoption. In contrast to Rabe’s [17], [18] qualitative
examination, they also find that a state’s unemployment rate decreases the likelihood that a state
will adopt an RPS. Rabe [18] finds that states often emphasize the potential economic benefits of
RPSs such as creating “green” jobs or gaining a competitive advantage as a first mover in renew-
able energy technology, but this does not seem to be a driving factor empirically as measured by
the unemployment rate. These papers give me confidence that RPS adoption is likely to be uncor-
related with many of the unobservables that would invalidate the instrument. Moreover, since RPS
policies affect neighboring states as well as the states in which they are passed, they are even less
likely to be correlated with in-region unobservables.
Since my instrument for changes in demand for renewable capacity is not just the beginning of
an RPS in the region, but also the implementation schedule that each RPS follows, the implemen-
tation schedule must be uncorrelated with in-region unobservable characteristics. Two main con-
cerns come to mind when considering the exogeneity of the RPS implementation schedules. First,
states that are early adopters of RPSs may have particularly aggressive implementation schedules,
either due to a strong desire to promote renewable electricity generation or because they have a lot
of renewable resources that can be exploited.
A second concern about the exogeneity of RPS implementation schedules is that states that
have a lot of renewable generating capacity at the time the RPS is passed will have more aggressive
implementation schedules. Since more aggressive implementation schedules likely lead to higher
REC prices sooner, existing renewable generators clearly have a lot to gain by lobbying state
legislatures for more stringent requirements.
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Both of these concerns can be addressed empirically by examining the state implementation
schedules. Since most RPSs follow a nearly linear implementation schedule, I estimate the slope
of the implementation schedule by regressing each schedule on a time trend. I then examine the
correlation between these slopes and variables that address the concerns raised above about the
endogeneity of implementation schedules.
To address the first concern that early adopter states have more aggressive implementation
schedules, I regress the slope of the implementation schedule requirements (in MW of required
new capacity) on the year that each state’s RPS went into effect. The coefficient on the year
the RPS went into effect is not statistically different from zero with a coefficient of -7.7 and a
standard error of 17.7. The point estimate suggests that early adopters require an extra 8 MW of
renewable capacity each year of an RPS but is clearly not statistically different from zero (p =
0.67). Moreover, an additional requirement of 8 MW per year is a relatively small difference given
that the average increase in RPS requirements is 166 MW per year.
To address the second concern that states with a larger renewable sector before RPS passage
will have a more aggressive implementation schedule, I regress the slope of the implementation
schedule on the renewable capacity in that state at the time of RPS passage. The coefficient is
not statistically different from zero with a coefficient of 0.18 and a standard error of 0.11. This
suggests that the implementation schedules are not a function of the renewable interests already
established in a particular state.
This may be because many states choose “round” numbers for both their end goal, such as “20%
renewable electricity by 2020,” and a linear implementation schedule. Likely, these end goals are
less amenable to manipulation by pressure groups and since the intervening years’ requirements
are essentially a linear interpolation back through time, the implementation schedule is not changed
much by pressure groups.
Another concern about my approach is that the RPS policies may spill over into other regions
that do not have RPSs or less stringent RPSs. However, there are likely only very small spillover
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effects in my setup since the unit of observation is a regional electricity market. Many states
publish a list of all of the approved generation facilities that are eligible to produce RECs that meet
the state RPS. While occasionally there are power generators located in states not included in the
wholesale power market, a vast majority of the approved generation facilities are indeed located in
states in the wholesale power market.
4.3 Key Variables
The primary variable of interest in the first stage regression is a variable constructed to measure
the stringency of a particular state’s RPS. Most states, with the exception of Iowa and Texas, set
their RPS goals out as a percentage of electricity sales, measured in megawatt hours (MWh). For
instance, Michigan’s RPS, passed in 2008 calls for 10% of each retail provider’s electricity sales
to come from renewable sources by the end of 2015 with a phase-in period beginning in 2012. The
first challenge we face is converting an RPS goal stated in MWh16 to our capacity data in MW.
One megawatt hour of electricity is created simply by a 1 MW facility producing at full capacity
for one hour. This means, in theory any facility’s nameplate capacity (in MW) can be converted
into a yearly capacity in MWh by multiplying the nameplate capacity by 8760(= 24⇥ 365) hours.
However, generators do not run the entire year since they must be shut down for maintenance
and may choose not to operate for any number of reasons, including bidding in a price that is
higher than the market clearing price in a particular hour. Plants that are almost always producing
are usually large coal and nuclear plants that operate between 85%-90% of the time (capacity factor
of 85%-90%). Other plants are built to only operate a small fraction (as little as 1% or less) of the
time, when the demand (and hence price) for electricity is at its peak. These generators tend to use
natural gas since they can bring themselves up to full capacity quickly. Wind generators typically
have a capacity factor near 35% [23] since wind is an intermittent resource. For the purposes of
16RPS goals are usually stated as a fraction of electricity sales, measured in MWh. Thus, it is simple to convert
percentage goals into MWh.
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our main analysis, we assume that all new plants have a capacity factor of 40% since most of the
needed capacity to meet RPSs is expected to be wind but some of it will be met with fuels that can
have a significantly higher capacity factor [20].17
In order to correctly measure the incentives of these policies I first need to construct a variable











where f is a particular fuel and F is the set of all eligible fuels. RPSCapMW
itf
is the sum of
nameplate capacities of all generators in state i at time t for fuel f , and AvgCF
f
is the average
capacity factor for fuel f .18 I set AvgCF, the average potential capacity factor for a particular fuel,
equal to 0.4 for wind and solar generators and 0.8 for all other generators.
Returning to the Michigan example, in order to figure out how hard this goal is to reach, we
must consider how much eligible renewable capacity already exists in Michigan to meet the RPS.
Some states have RPS implementation schedules such that during the first few years of the RPS,
the whole requirement can be met with existing generating capacity.19 As mentioned above, each
state treats existing capacity differently. Since MI allows existing renewable capacity to be eligible
to meet the RPS, to compute the incentives created by the RPS, I subtract the eligible capacity at
the time the RPS was passed from each year’s RPS requirement.
Using the amount of renewable generating capacity at the time the RPS was passed, I calculate
17Figure 5 shows that it is indeed the case that most of the change in generating capacity over the last few years has
been in wind capacity.
18Capacity factor is the fraction of hours in a year that a generator is producing electricity.
19This means it is possible for an RPS to create zero incentive in some or all years. For instance, Maine passed an
RPS in September 1999 that had a final goal that was less than the existing eligible capacity within the state. Subse-
quently, in 2006 Maine passed another RPS that only new renewable facilities were eligible to meet the requirement.
This is the RPS we consider for Maine in this paper.
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This adjusted requirement measure will be our key independent variable as it capture much of
the heterogeneity across state policies and I expect the coefficient on it to be positive and signifi-
cant.
After computing these variables on the state level, they are aggregated up to the regional level
by weighting them by each state’s electricity consumption share in the region.20 Moreover, since
I am using price data in the second stage, I need to limit my sample to regions that have a robust
wholesale electricity market and REC market. Thus, I will be focusing on three regions of the
country: New England, the Mid-Atlantic states in PJM, and Texas.21
The final I need to construct is the complete price that renewable generators receive for the
electricity they produce. As mentioned above, there are two revenue streams for renewable gener-
ators under an RPS: the revenue from each megawatt hour of electricity they sell into the electricity
market and the revenue they receive from each REC associated with each megawatt hour of elec-
tricity that retail providers retire at the end of each year to comply with the RPS. This means that









20The weights are computed using a state’s consumption share in 2003 to keep them across time. Changing the
weights to the contemporaneous consumption share in each region does not change the results.
21I exclude California from the analysis because until recently, there was not a market for RECs since the California
Public Utility Commission required retail providers to purchase both renewable electricity and its attributes (essentially
RECs) together via bilateral (private) contracts. Therefore, there is not a market price for RECs to use in the second
stage. I exclude Midwest states since there is not a developed market for RECs. I also exclude New York since the
New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) centrally procures the RECs for the entire
state’s commitment through an annual bidding process. It is not clear that this processes elicits the same price due to
possible market power on behalf of the NYSERDA.
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5 Data
To estimate the empirical models, I use data on all existing electricity generators and production
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). I collect data on REC prices from public utility
commission reports and electricity price data from independent system operators of wholesale
electricity markets. Data on central policy variables are aggregated from the North Carolina State
University’s Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency.
5.1 Generation Capacity Data
The Energy Information Administration annually surveys all electricity generators to collect basic
data for each electric generating unit in the United States. All generators that have a potential
capacity of at least 1 megawatt, are connected to the electric power grid, and are able to deliver
power are required to fill out form EIA-860. The data files include information about each gener-
ator including its capacity, all fuels used during that year, the year and month the generator began
operation, the year and month of retirement, the city and state that the plant is located in, and basic
information about the owner.
Though these data are reported annually to the EIA, they can be translated into monthly data
on total generating capacity since the data report the first month of operation for each plant. I use
the data reported in these surveys from 1999-2007.
In these data, each generator provides detailed data on the type of fuel used during that year
for electricity generation, including up to six or more fuels that were used. I consider the first
fuel listed as the generator’s primary fuel.22 For the purposes of this paper, I aggregate these fuels
into 17 categories. Most of the fuels that are lumped into the same category are different types of
coal, petroleum products, and various waste products. None of these fuels are considered to be
22Only one-third of plants report using two fuels, and less than 5 percent report using more than two fuels. Of
the plants that list using two fuels, only 6 percent of generators that are categorized as using a renewable fuel list a
non-renewable fuel as their second fuel, concentrated among generators that are categorized as biomass, landfill gas,
and municipal solid waste.
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renewable in any of the RPSs and therefore this aggregation should not affect the results.
5.2 Electricity Sales and Production Data
In order to translate a RPS requirement that is usually in terms of percent of sales of electricity and
to create each state’s weight in the region I use data from the Energy Information Administration’s
state historical tables on electricity sales. These data report the total megawatt hours sold in the
entire electric industry for a given state in a given year. I also use data on electricity generation
aggregated to the state⇥year level by the EIA. These aggregate data are based on another survey
the EIA conducts, EIA-906.
5.3 Price Data
Data on the wholesale price of electricity were collected from each Independent System Operator’s
(ISO) web site. ISOs publish data on the market clearing price of electricity for many locations
in each region for every hour of the day. Where available, I use the published regional weighted
average price for each hour and then average the price over each calendar month. Some ISOs do
not publish a regional electricity price, instead only publishing data for each location in the ISO.
Where this is the case, I take a simple arithmetic mean of the prices across all locations to form an
hourly regional price and then average this mean over the entire calendar month.
In order to compute the complete price that renewable electricity generators receive for their
electricity, I need to add the price of renewable energy credits (RECs) to the price of the electricity.
I have collected average annual prices for RECs in every state that allows RECs to be purchased
separately from electricity. These prices are gathered from public utility commission documents
or other agencies administering a state’s RPS.
The raw price data for REC prices can be seen in Figure 8. The state REC prices exhibit
distinctly regional variation confirming that the market for RECs is indeed regional. Much of the
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within-region variation is due to some temporary state-level policy uncertainty and small variations
in eligible fuels, as well as small variations in which generators are certified in which state.
5.4 Policy Variables
The policy variables are constructed from information compiled at North Carolina State’s Database
of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE). DSIRE has cataloged all state incentives
for renewable energy including the date they were enacted, when and if they were modified, as
well as many details about each policy. Where necessary, this information was supplemented by
consulting the actual state statutes.
The variables that were constructed include the date that a particular renewable energy policy
was passed by the legislature, when the policy began to bind (if different), and the implementation
schedules for RPSs. In addition, information for each RPS regarding what fuels are eligible to
meet the requirements, and in some cases maximum capacities for eligible facilities, were taken
from this database.
In addition to collecting data on state RPSs from DSIRE, I collect data about other policies that
have been implemented in some states that could change the incentives for renewable electricity
generators. These policies include:
• Net metering: This type of legislation requires that electricity meters “run backward.” If
a customer has installed generation equipment on site (usually a photovoltaic solar panel)
that produces more electricity than a customer is currently consuming, the excess electricity
is fed back onto the grid and the customer’s electricity bill is credited the retail electricity
rate for each kilowatt hour. (See Borenstein [4] for an analysis of these policies.) This net
metering may provide an additional incentive for electricity customers to invest in their own
generating capacity and then sell the RECs from this generation.
• Public Benefits Fund: In many states with competitive wholesale electricity markets, re-
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tail electricity providers are required to levy a surcharge on all rate payers to remit to the
state government. This money is often used for energy efficiency programs, to help finance
renewable energy projects including transmission and distribution projects, and to assist low-
income rate payers. Since these funds partly subsidize renewable generation, they are con-
trolled for in the regressions.
• Government Purchases of Green Electricity: Some state governments have committed
themselves to purchasing a share of their electricity from renewable sources. Since gov-
ernments are large customers, this may (and is presumably hoped to) affect the amount of
renewable capacity. Though both government purchases of green electricity and RPSs re-
quire retail providers to retire RECs in the amount of the green purchases, the RECs retired
are not counted toward a retail provider’s RPS requirement.
• Mandatory Green Power Option: Some states have passed legislation that requires retail
electricity providers to offer their customers an option to purchase green electricity. Retail
providers are allowed to charge extra for providing this electricity. These customer purchases
generally are explicitly forbidden from counting toward the RPS requirement. These policies
may, however, increase renewable capacity if a sufficient number of customers sign up for
these programs.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the policy variables listed above. The top panel dis-
plays summary statistics after aggregating state policies to the region level, and the bottom panel
displays the RPS requirements during my sample period for individual states. These bottom statis-
tics correspond to the values of the light blue bars in Figure 1.
Just over half of the region-months in my sample have an active RPS in the region, with a mean
renewable requirement of 0.6% renewable generation and a maximum of 2.5%. The mean RPS
requirement, conditional on an RPS being enforced, is just over 1% of electricity consumption
coming from renewable generation. Taking a look at the state-level data, I observe just 20% of
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state-months in our sample with an active RPS, with an average requirement of 1.7% renewable
generation, conditional on an operational RPS.
5.5 Data Restrictions
As discussed before, there are many dimensions of heterogeneity across state RPSs. In order to
simplify my analysis, I will only consider the first tier of each state’s RPS. Typically, if a state has
multiple tiers to its RPS, the second, third, and fourth tiers allow a greater degree of flexibility for
fuels that have higher carbon emissions per unit of heat input. Tiers two and below tend to include
fuels such as municipal solid waste or large, existing hydroelectric facilities. (Some states with a
single tiered RPS include these fuel types in the RPS.)
If a particular fuel counts for both tier one and tier two in a state, I attribute all of the capacity
from facilities using that fuel to fulfilling the first tier of the RPS. Compliance RECs for the first tier
are uniformly more expensive than compliance RECs for other tiers (with the exception of states
with a solar photovoltaic tier), so this assumption is likely consistent with firm incentives [22]. To
the extent that not considering these other tiers of RPSs biases my results, the results should bias
the elasticity toward zero. This is because I may be excluding some renewable facilities that may
have been built in response to an RPS.
I also do not examine the solar photovoltaic (PV) tiers of state RPSs. Usually if a state has a
specific tier for PV, it is the only fuel in that tier. These tiers usually have small requirements, since
PV is an expensive way to produce electricity. Moreover, most PV installations are excluded from
my data since only generators over 1 megawatt are required to report to the EIA. PV installations




Aggregating state policies to a regional policy is relatively straightforward. Each state’s RPS re-
quirement is weighted by the fraction of electricity consumption that the state accounts for in the
region. Thus, if a region consists of three states, state A consumes 50% of the electricity in the
region and states B and C each consume 25% of regional electricity. If state A passes an RPS
that requires 2% of the electricity sold in that state, the region then is assigned an RPS require-
ment of 1% (= 2%⇥50%). In the following year, state A’s requirement increases to 3% and state
B introduces a 1% requirement so the region’s RPS requirement is then 1.75% (= 3%⇥50% +
1%⇥25%).
The other state level policy variables (public benefits funds, green power options, etc.) are
aggregated in a similar fashion to this, except each variable is simply an indicator for each state, so
the variables take on the cumulative fraction of electricity consumption in the region covered by
those policies.23
6 Results
The results from the first stage regression are displayed in Table 3. Column 1 begins by simply
regressing the logarithm of the total price for renewable electricity (electricity price + REC price)
on the logarithm of the average effective RPS requirement for renewable capacity in that region
over the following five years.24 As mentioned above, the average requirement is used since it is
correlated with future stream of payments over the lifetime of the generator.
We see that the measure of the stringency of an RPS is statistically and economically signifi-
cant. Column 2 allows each type of control policy to have a one-off effect in the region once any
23For simplicity, the weights used are calculated as the state’s fraction of consumption in the region during 2003.
This keeps the policy and RPS variables weakly monotonic across time. It is unlikely that generators can accurately
predict the small variations in electricity consumption across regions for them to take these fluctuations into account.
Changing the year used for the weights or using contemporaneous weights do not change the results.
24All specifications are robust to the number of years over which the effective requirement variable is averaged.
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state adopts it. Column 3 instead adds control variables that can take values between zero and one
depending on the fraction of electricity consumption in the region that is covered by one of the
policies. Column 4 allows for both a one-off effect in the region and an increasing effect over time
as more states in the region adopt these policies. This flexible specification makes sense intuitively,
since I would expect that the more expansive these policies are, the larger in magnitude the effect
should be. The point estimates for the excluded instrument, the average stringency of the RPS over
the next five years, are relatively stable across columns.
Examining the other coefficients in Column 4, the coefficients match my intuition about the
direction of the effect. I expect a positive effect on REC prices from government purchases of
green power since this increases the demand for green power without decreasing the demand for
RECs. Most states do not allow green power purchased through government purchases, to count
toward retail providers’ REC fulfillment obligations; instead these purchases simply add buyers
into the green electricity / REC market. I also see that public benefits funds tend to reduce the
price of RECs. Again, this matches our intuition since often the money collected in public benefits
funds is used to subsidize the construction of renewable generating facilities, thus reducing the
price needed to make the facilities profitable.
The last row of each column shows the F-statistic of a test that the excluded instrument in the
regression is zero. All four columns reject the null that both coefficients are zero at all usual levels
of confidence. This gives confidence moving forward that the instruments are indeed relevant.
All standard errors in this table and the second stage regressions are estimated using Newey-
West heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors. The number of lags included
in the auto-correlation estimation was chosen using the procedure suggested by Newey and West
[13].
Table 4 displays the results from the second stage regression that estimates the price elasticity
of supply for renewable electricity generators. The variable of interest in this set of regressions
is the first row, \Log(Total Price). This is the predicted price of RECs in the region given the
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shift in demand induced by the stringency of the state RPS estimated in the first stage. Though the
elasticity estimates vary across specifications, the preferred estimate in Column 4 is between the
other estimates, which allows the other policies to enter in multiple ways.
Column 1 shows a baseline specification without any additional controls, with Columns 2-4
progressing to a full set of flexible controls for other policies aimed at renewable generators. The
preferred estimate in column 4 of the price elasticity is 2.714. Thus, for every 1% increase in
the price of RECs, there will approximately a 2.7% increase in renewable generating capacity. In
the next section I will use this estimate to bound the cost of focusing on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions through only an RPS-style policy.
7 Policy Implications for RPSs as a CO2 Abatement Tool
In this section, I use my estimates of the long-run supply elasticity of renewable generating capacity
to estimate the cost of decreasing carbon dioxide emissions in states covered by the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative by pursuing carbon dioxide reductions exclusively through an RPS.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cap-and-trade program established in the
northeastern United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from electric power plants to 10
percent below (approximately) 2005 levels by 2018. There are currently ten states participating
in RGGI, including all of the states in the New England wholesale electricity market, New York,
and parts of the PJM wholesale electricity market.25 In these states, RGGI regulates all fossil fuel
fired electricity generators in the 10 states that have a capacity of 25 megawatts or more. Each
quarter, new emissions permits are auctioned with approximately 70% of the auction proceeds
being invested in energy efficiency and renewable generation projects.
The states in RGGI had a total of 184 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions from the elec-
25The ten states currently participating in RGGI are: Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, Main, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The major states in the PJM wholesale electricity
market that are not participating in RGGI are Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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tricity sector in 200526 [1]. Beginning in 2009 and continuing through 2014, carbon dioxide emis-
sions are capped at the baseline level of 188 million tons. Beginning in 2015, the carbon dioxide
cap is reduced by 2.5% annually until the final goal is met after 2018 when carbon dioxide emis-
sions are reduced by 10% from the original cap. Under the RGGI cap-and-trade program, emission
reductions are most likely to come from using a different mix of fuel to produce electricity (more
natural gas and renewable sources, less coal) and energy efficiency investments. This suggests that
the carbon price in the RGGI market provides a good cost estimate of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in the electricity sector through ways that differ from an RPS’s exclusive reliance on
switching production to renewable sources.
I will examine two different levels of carbon reduction produced by a northeastern RPS, a 2.5%
reduction of 2005 CO2 levels and a 10% reduction of 2005 CO2 levels, to compare to the cost of
carbon dioxide abatement through RGGI. In order to estimate the cost of carbon dioxide abatement
under an RPS, in addition to knowing the price elasticity of supply or renewable generation that
I estimated in the previous section, I need to make a few assumptions. Whenever possible, I
will make assumptions that will make an RPS look as favorable (lowest cost of carbon dioxide
abatement) as possible so my estimates will be a lower bound on the cost of CO2 abatement under
an RPS.
First, I need to make an assumption about what fossil fuel the new renewable capacity will be
displacing. As can be seen in Table 1, coal is the fuel that emits the most amount of CO2 per unit
of heat input at 215 pounds of CO2 per million British Thermal Units (MMBTU). Therefore, to
make an RPS look as attractive as possible, I will assume that each megawatt hour of renewable
generation produces no carbon dioxide and replaces a megawatt hour of coal production.27 To the
extent that renewable generation produces carbon dioxide or displaces generation other than coal,
26The baseline level of carbon dioxide emissions that the RGGI reductions are based on is 188 million tons of CO2.
27For renewable resources, such as wind, that are not completely predictable, there is some carbon emissions from
using these sources since more generators need to be on standby in case the electrical output is less than expected.
Compounding this, usually these standby generators need to ramp up their output quickly which creates higher than
average emissions per MMBTU consumed. I abstract from both of these issues.
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an RPS would have a higher cost of carbon abatement than I estimate.
Secondly, I need to assume a capacity factor (the fraction of the year that a generator produces
electricity) for the new renewable generation built to meet the RPS. As discussed above, a capacity
factor of 85% is in the upper range for fossil generation and 35% is relatively high for wind gener-
ation. I assume a capacity factor of 40% for all new renewable generation that is built for the RPS.
This acknowledges that most of the renewable generation being built in response to RPSs are wind
turbines, but some is likely to be from other sources with a higher potential capacity factor such as
biomass and landfill gas generation.28
Finally, I need to assume something about how the demand for electricity changes in the future.
I will assume that electricity consumption does not change from the amount consumed in 2005.
Likely, electricity consumption will grow between now and 2015 (the first year that the RGGI CO2
cap is decreased).29
In 2005, the total renewable generating capacity in RGGI states was 2,932 megawatts. If every
megawatt hour of renewable generating capacity displaces a megawatt hour of coal generation,
a 40 percent increase in renewable generating capacity would achieve a 2.5% decrease in CO2
emissions in RGGI. Using my preferred elasticity estimate of 2.7, this means renewable generators
would need a price increase of 15% in order to be profitable. Since the total price of electricity for
renewable generators (electricity price plus REC price) averaged $82 per megawatt hour, a 15%
increase implies that renewable generators would need to receive approximately $94 per megawatt
hour to be profitable. This implies a marginal cost of CO2 abatement of over $12.
A more reasonable assumption is that each megawatt hour of renewable electricity produced
replaces the carbon emissions of an “average” megawatt hour,30 which requires a 68% increase in
28Another renewable source that is included in nearly all RPSs is solar photovoltaics (solar cells). However, these
typically have a capacity factor near 15% and are currently too expensive to be deployed on a large enough scale to
make a significant contribution to renewable capacity.
29Electricity consumption has grown by approximately 2.75 million megawatt hours annually in the northeast be-
tween 1990 and 2008. Electricity consumption in the northeast in 2005 was 278 million megawatt hours.
30Average is defined as the total tons of CO2 produced by the electricity industry divided by the number of megawatt
hours consumed in a year.
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renewable generating capacity. The preferred elasticity estimate tells us that renewable generators
would need a 25% increase in price to enter the market. This implies a marginal cost of CO2
abatement of $35 per ton of CO2.
The final goal of RGGI is to reduce CO2 emissions by 10 percent from their 2005 levels. In
order to achieve a reduction of this size from an RPS, there would need to be a 163% increase in
the renewable generating capacity in RGGI states. In order for my estimate of the cost of CO2
abatement to be correct, the price elasticity has to be correct for the entire supply curve. While I
am comfortable making the assumption that my price elasticity estimate is nearly correct for the
smaller changes above, I am hesitant to believe my estimate is correct for this large of an increase
in renewable capacity.
With this caveat in mind, I proceed to extrapolate the cost of CO2 abatement from an RPS that
reduces CO2 emissions by 10% from their 2005 levels. In order to move that far up the long-run
supply curve for renewable generation, the total price renewable generators would need to receive
for their electricity is $132, implying a marginal cost of CO2 abatement of $50. If instead of
replacing coal generation, renewable capacity replaced the “average” megawatt hour of generation,
the marginal cost of CO2 abatement to decrease emissions by 10% is $140. A summary of these
results can be found in Table 5.
These estimates of the marginal cost of CO2 abatement, ranging from $10 to $140 depending
on how much carbon is abated and what fuel the renewable generation replaces, are substantially
higher than the expected cost of carbon abatement under the RGGI cap-and-trade system. Cur-
rently the RGGI CO2 emissions permits being traded and auctioned are for the years when CO2
emissions are capped at a level just over 2005 CO2 emissions. However, since these permits can
be banked indefinitely into the future, they give us a window into the expected marginal cost of
CO2 abatement in the future. Currently the price of emissions permits are at approximately $2 per
ton of CO2, and permits were trading at approximately $3 per ton of CO2 in early 2009 with an
average price of $2.50 per ton of CO2 over two years of trading. Since permits purchased today
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can be used to comply with RGGI indefinitely into the future, the current price is indicative of
future CO2 abatement costs. Moreover, the price of contracts for CO2 emissions permits in 2012
(the furthest ahead future contracts are traded at the moment) is similar to the current price of CO2
permits further suggesting that prices are not expected to increase.31
These results suggest that within the electricity sector, an RPS is an expensive way to decrease
carbon dioxide emissions, costing between six and seventeen times more to reduce CO2 emissions
by 2.5% than from a cap-and-trade program. Moreover, since both RGGI and an RPS focus just
on the electricity sector, the marginal cost of CO2 abatement in the economy as a whole is likely
lower than either of these estimates since there may be cheaper ways to decrease CO2 emissions in
other sectors of the economy.
8 Conclusion
This paper estimates the long-run supply elasticity of renewable electricity generating capacity.
The price elasticity is an important parameter for policy makers to know since many states have
introduced aggressive RPSs to increase the share of renewable electricity sold in their states. Also,
the US Congress has considered legislation on multiple occasions that would introduce a federal
RPS. Since RPSs’ main goal are to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, it is important to know the
cost of the carbon abatement from these policies relative to other ways that could reduce carbon
dioxide emissions.
In order to estimate this parameter, I use the policy variation in the the implementation schedule
of renewable portfolio standards across states that have restructured electricity markets. Since
most state RPSs can be met by renewable generation located anywhere in the wholesale electricity
31RGGI has two mechanisms built into its structure to curb potential price volatility. If the average price of CO2
permits is above $7 for a 12-month period, more permits are released and generators are allowed to meet more of
their obligations through offsets. If the average price of CO2 permits is above $10 for a 12-month period, a second
mechanism is triggered and even more offsets can be used to meet CO2 obligations. It is widely expected that neither
of these trigger events will happen, suggesting that it is unlikely that the the marginal cost of CO2 abatement is below
$10 in the electricity sector in the states in RGGI.
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market, I aggregate individual state policies into region-level renewable portfolio standards. Each
year, each state’s RPS increases in its stringency, creating the variation that I use to estimate the
the long-run supply elasticity. In my preferred specification, I estimate that a 1 percent increase in
the total price received for renewable electricity (price of electricity plus the price of the renewable
energy credit) results in a 2.7% increase in the supply of renewable generation.
Politicians appear to prefer using RPS policies to those of broader policies such as cap and
trade or a carbon tax. Part of the attraction is likely that the costs of this method of carbon diox-
ide abatement are less transparent to voters. However, these policies still come with a cost. My
estimates suggest that the cost of abating the last ton of carbon dioxide from an RPS in the north-
eastern US to reduce emissions by 10 percent from their 2005 levels (approximately equal to a
6 percent RPS) would cost between $50 and $140 per ton of carbon dioxide, depending on the
type of fossil generation that the renewable generation was replacing. My estimate for the cost of
CO2 abatement is more than 5 times more expensive than the maximum price of CO2 under the
regional cap-and-trade program for the electricity sector. Therefore, residents would be paying a
extremely high premium for carbon dioxide abatement under RPSs, even though they appear to be
more politically palatable policies.
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9 Tables
Table 1: Environmental Impact of Common Fuels and Frequency of Inclusion in Renewable Port-
folio Standards
Percent of States
Pounds of CO2 that Consider Average
per MMBtu Fuel as Renewable Generator Size (MW)
Wind 0 1.00 27.3
Solar Photovoltaic 0 0.89 0
Biomass⇤ 0 0.89 14.0
Solar Thermal 0 0.81 17.0
Geothermal 0 0.70 21.5
Hydropower 0 0.70 86.6, 6.0
Nuclear 0 0 999.9
Municipal Solid Waste 92 0.26 26.1
Landfill Gas 115 0.78 1.4
Natural Gas 123 0 62.3
Petroleum 166 0 18.1
Coal 215 0 222.3
Number of States with RPS 27
CO2 estimates taken from Energy Information Administration.
⇤ Biofuels contain “biogenic” carbon and are not considered to add to atmo-
spheric carbon levels. [14]
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Standard
Mean Deviation Min Max N
Active RPS in Region 0.556 0.498 0 1 293
RPS Requirement in Region 0.600 0.747 0 2.476 293
RPS Requirement when Active in Region 1.079 0.697 0 2.476 163
Mandatory Green Power Option in Region 0.041 0.199 0 1 293
Government Purchases of Green Power in Region 0.491 0.501 0 1 293
Public Benefits Fund in Region 0.724 0.448 0 1 293
Net Metering Laws in Region 0.724 0.448 0 1 293
Active RPS in State 0.200 0.400 0 1 1848
RPS Requirement in State 0.339 0.882 0 4.92 1848
RPS Requirement when Active in State 1.698 1.261 0 4.92 369
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Table 3: First Stage Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log(Total Renewable Electricity Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Average Stringency
t,t+5 years) 0.184⇤⇤ 0.268⇤⇤ 0.254⇤⇤ 0.298⇤⇤
(0.047) (0.062) (0.058) (0.068)
I(Green Power Option) 0.074 0.162⇤
(0.061) (0.071)
I(Gov’t Power Purchase) 0.181⇤ 0.108
(0.082) (0.097)
I(Public Benefits Fund) 0.192⇤ 0.844⇤
(0.086) (0.317)
Gov’t Power Purchase (Frac. of Consumption) 0.121⇤ 0.103
(0.053) (0.066)
Public Benefits Fund (Frac. of Consumption)  0.081  0.118
(0.075) (0.076)
Net Metering (Frac. of Consumption) 0.010  0.031
(0.035) (0.038)
Observations 293 293 293 293
R
2 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.59
F-test that excluded instrument equal to zero 15.61 18.64 19.05 19.36
OLS estimates. Estimates include region, year, and month fixed effects as
well as region specific trends. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation using the Newey-West method. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Table 4: Second Stage Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log(Renewable Generating Capacity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
\Log(Total Price) 1.810⇤⇤ 3.810⇤⇤ 1.732⇤⇤ 2.714⇤⇤
(0.520) (0.872) (0.412) (0.611)
I(Green Power Option)  0.269  0.452
(0.257) (0.234)
I(Gov’t Power Purchase) 0.616⇤ 0.763⇤
(0.232) (0.238)
I(Public Benefits Fund) 0.072  3.824⇤⇤
(0.383) (0.816)
Gov’t Power Purchase (Frac. of Consumption) 0.450⇤⇤ 0.144
(0.090) (0.195)
Public Benefits Fund (Frac. of Consumption) 0.815⇤⇤ 0.750⇤⇤
(0.141) (0.202)
Net Metering (Frac. of Consumption) 0.424⇤⇤ 0.344⇤⇤
(0.070) (0.097)
Observations 293 293 293 293
First Stage F-statistic 15.61 18.64 19.05 19.36
OLS estimates. Estimates include region, year, and month fixed effects as
well as region specific trends. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation using the Newey-West method. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Table 5: Cost of CO2 Abatement From an RPS
Replace Replace
Coal Average Fuel
2.5% Reduction in CO2 Levels
Percent Increase in Renewable Capacity 41% 68%
Cost of CO2 Abatement $12.46 $34.82
10% Reduction in CO2 Levels
Percent Increase in Renewable Capacity 163% 273%
Cost of CO2 Abatement $49.86 $139.28
All CO2 reductions are measured from the 2005 baseline lev-
els, similarly to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
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10 Figures
Figure 1: Statutory Renewable Requirements for Selected States
Figure 2: Timing of Renewable Portfolio Standard Adoption
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Figure 3: Timing of Renewable Portfolio Standard Adoption by State
Figure 4: Selected Wholesale Electricity Markets
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Figure 5: Capacity for Renewable Generation by Fuel




























Figure 7: Electricity Capacity Market with RPS
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